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NOTES
THE RIGHT OF ATTORNEYS TO UNIONIZE,
COLLECTIVELY BARGAIN, AND STRIKE: LEGAL
AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some analysts believe that the birth of the new century will witness
the death of the organized labor movement.' During the past two
decades, participation in organized labor unions has declined
dramatically. Historically, the labor movement has derived its strength
from blue-collar employees.' The decrease in the number of blue-collar
employees in the workforce is the principle cause of the decline in union
membership.4 During this same period, however, the rate of unionization
among professional employees has substantially increased.5 Doctors,
nurses, architects, journalists, musicians, pharmacists, and even lawyers
now belong to unions.6 Indeed, professional employees have been
characterized as the "primary hope for the future of the American labor
* This Note was the recipient of the New York State Bar Association's Law Student Legal Ethics
Award for 2000. The Award is presented in recognition of extraordinary accomplishment in a
written exposition concerning legal ethics.
1. See Charles B. Craver, Why Labor Unions Must [and Can] Survive, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 15, 17 (1998) ("Many people believe that labor organizations are outmoded institutions
providing representational services no longer needed by individuals employed by enlightened
business enterprises.") [hereinafter Craver, Why Labor Unions].
2. See Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve
Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 400 (1992); see also David M. Rabban, Can
American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargainingby Professional Employees?, 99 YALE
L.J. 689, 690 (1990) [hereinafter Rabban, American LaborLaw].
3. See Craver, Why Labor Unions, supra note 1, at 25.
4. See Donna Sockell, The Future of Labor Law: A Mismatch Betveen Statutory
Interpretation and Industrial Reality?, 30 B.C. L. REV. 987, 996 (1989); Marina Angel,
Professionalsand Unionization,66 MINN. L. REV. 383, 385 (1982).
5. See Rabban, American LaborLaw, supra note 2, at 690; see also Sockell, supra note 4, at
995; Angel, supra note 4, at 385.
6. See Bruce Roepe, Law, Lawyers & Labor, OR. ST. B. BuLL., June 1997, 21, at 21.
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movement." 7
This Note argues that lawyers in both the public and private sectors
have an interest in joining the current trend toward unionization among
professional employees. Part II identifies the conditions under which
lawyers qualify as "employees" and, thus, have the right under federal
and state law, to organize and collectively bargain. Part III examines
specific workplace problems that might lead attorneys to seek relief in
collective action. Part IV considers circumstances in which workplace
problems undermine lawyers' ability to comply with their ethical
obligations as set forth in rules of professional conduct. Part V discusses
the ways in which attorneys who belong to unions can use their
organizational power to achieve their professional goals.
11. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
This Part identifies the conditions under which attorneys have the
right to unionize and collectively bargain. The first section notes the
distinction between private and public sector employees with respect to
this right and discusses the status of private sector professional
employees under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act").'
The second section focuses on administrative and judicial rulings that
have recognized the circumstances in which attorneys are entitled to
protection under federal and state law.
A. ProfessionalEmployees Under the NationalLabor RelationsAct
The NLRA, the basic federal law governing collective bargaining,
applies only to employees in the private sector.9 Public sector
employees, on the other hand, are covered by state and federal law,
which incorporates many of the doctrines of the NLRA model ° For
employees who qualify as "professionals," the relevant distinction for
coverage is between those who have supervisory or managerial authority
and those who lack such authority." In the private sector, any
7. Rabban, American LaborLaw, supranote 2, at 690.

8. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (excluding the United States and "any State or political
subdivision thereof" from the definition of "employer" and thus from NLRA coverage).
10. See Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1611, 1678-80
(1984) (explaining how state legislatures began enacting statutes in the late 1950s and 1960s
enabling collective bargaining by state, county, and municipal employees).
11. See David M. Rabban, DistinguishingExcluded Managersfrom Covered Professionals
Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1775, 1782 (1989) [hereinafter Rabban, Distinguishing
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professional employee who is not also a supervisor or manager is on the
side of labor and entitled to protection under the NLRA12 However,
many public employees who would be excluded as supervisors or
managers under the NLRA are allowed to bargain under protection of
state law." According to rulings of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board") and the courts, attorneys in both the public and
private sectors are subject to the rules governing professional
employees. 4
The NLRA is this country's most significant legislation protecting a
worker's right to collectively bargain. When the NLRA was enacted in
1935, it gave protection to anyone who qualified as an "employee."' 5 No
distinction was made between professional and nonprofessional
employees. Subsequent to the passage of the NLRA, employers argued
that professional, supervisory, and managerial employees should be
employee "because of their
excluded from the Act's definition of 1an
7
special relationships with management.'
In 1947, Congress responded by passing the Taft-Hartley
Amendments, which excluded "supervisors" from the Act's protection.
The term "supervisor" describes an individual who has authority "in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances."' 9 A
professional employee who does not engage in any of these twelve
activities is not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
The key to the managerial exception is the requirement that
managerial employees participate in the determination of company
policy."' For example, an employee who makes decisions about wage
rates,2 ' determines the conduct of labor relations, 22 has authority to make

ExcludedManagers].
12. See id. at 1799; see also Roepe, supranote 6, at 22.
13. See Rabban, DistinguishingExcluded Managers,supranote 11, at 1780 n.13.
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (stating who qualifies as an "employee" under the Act).
16. Twelve years later, the Supreme Court stated that supervisors are employees covered by
the Act and that it was "for Congress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with
[the Act's] plain terms." Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485,490 (1947).
17. Rabban, DistinguishingExcludedManagers,supranote 11, at 1782.
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
19. Id.
20. See Chrysler Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 239,247 (1944); Armour & Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1462, 1465
(1944).
21. See, e.g., Elec. Auto Lite Co., 57 N.L.R.B. 723, 725-26 (1944).
22. See, e.g., Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 626,628-29 (1945).
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financial commitments' or participates in the selection of production
techniques 2 4 has been determined to be a managerial employee. These
responsibilities are similar to those of supervisors, but the Board has
held that there is a difference between supervisors and managers:
supervisors have the authority to make personnel decisions while
managers do not.25 Thus, a professional employee who does not
participate in the determination of company policy is not a managerial
employee for the purposes of the Act. As the Supreme Court stated in
NLRB v. Yeshiva University2 "an application of the managerial
exclusion... would [not] sweep all professionals outside the Act in
derogation of Congress' expressed intent to protect them.... Only if an
employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely
performed by... professionals will he be found aligned with
management."2 7
At the same time that Congress excluded "supervisors" and
"managers" from coverage under the NLRA, Congress amended the Act
explicitly to cover "professional employees."' The NLRA defines a
"professional employee" as:
[A]ny employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and
varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical
or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion
and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the
output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in
relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by
a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in
an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a
general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training
in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes.
In further identifying
NLRB, in a series of
interests and functions
employees,"° and often
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

the employees covered by this definition, the
decisions, has reasoned that professionals have
that differ from those of traditional rank-and-file
work in different departments.3 In addition, they

See, e.g., Inland Steel Container Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 138, 141 (1944).
See, e.g., Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1496 (1944).
See Chi. Daily News, Inc., 56 N.L.R.B. 274,278 (1944).
444 U.S. 672 (1980).
Id. at 690.
See Rabban, DistinguishingExcluded Managers,supranote 11, at 1794.
29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a).
See Gen. Cable Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 1651, 1652-55 (1944); Oliver Farm Equip. Co., 53
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tend to have greater training,32 skill,33 responsibility' autonomy and
discretion,35 as well as higher salaries.36
While the Taft-Hartley Amendments created ambiguities in
distinguishing supervisors and managers from rank-and-file professional
employees, a professional employee is not per se excluded from
coverage under the NLRA." As long as a professional employee is
outside the supervisory and managerial exceptions, he or she has all the
rights of a nonprofessional employee.38 These include "the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of [his or her] own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."39
B. When an Attorney is Neither a SupervisorNor a Manager
Like other professional employees in the private sector, attorneys
are subject to rulings of the NLRB with respect to their status as
"employees." The NLRB has addressed the question of when an attorney
is neither a supervisor nor a manager primarily in decisions involving
private, nonprofit legal aid organizations. In Neighborhood Legal
Services, Inc.40 the Board found that attorneys employed as "unit heads"
by a nonprofit organization engaged in the provision of legal services to
indigent clients were neither supervisors nor managers, and were thus
properly included in a bargaining unit as employees.4 ' The attorneys in
question engaged in such activities as interviewing clients, researching
the facts and law of their particular cases, preparing court pleadings,

N.L.R.B. 1078, 1086-87 (1943).
31. See Micamold Radio Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 888, 890 (1944); Permanente Metals Corp., 45
N.L.R.B. 931,934 (1942).
32. See Gen. Cable Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. at 1653; Oliver Farm Equip. Co., 53 N.L.R.B. at
1087; Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 159, 171 (1937).
33. See Permanente Metals Corp., 45 N.L.R.B. at 934; Warfield Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 58, 64
(1938); Allis-ChalmersMfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. at 171.
34. See, e.g., Warfield Co., 6 N.L.R.B. at 64.
35. See, e.g., Shell Dev. Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 192, 196 (1942).
36. See Gen. Cable Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. at 1654; Warfield Co., 6 N.L.R.B. at 64.
37. See Noranda Aluminum, Inc. v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 268, 271 (8th Cir. 1984); Passaic Daily
News v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1543, 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Meredith Corp. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 1332,
1342 (10th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 644 F.2d 939, 943 (2d Cir. 1981).

38. See 29 U.S.C.
39. Id.

§ 157.

40. 236 N.L.R.B. 1269 (1978).

41. See id.
at 1273.
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negotiating settlements, and contacting administrative agencies. 2 As unit
heads, the attorneys represented clients in court, had administrative
responsibility for various record-keeping functions, communicated
between management and the staff members of their units, and assumed
professional responsibility for the non-attorneys' work, as required by
the ethics rules.43 In addition, the unit heads were responsible for
monitoring timecards of both the professionals and nonprofessionals in
their units.44
The Board rejected the employer's contention that the unit heads
had developed into a "first layer of supervision over the operation of the
units.' ' 5 In so finding, the Board noted that the attorneys were without
the power to "hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
reward, discipline, or adjust grievances of other employees" within their
units and lacked the authority to recommend any of these actions."
Further, although the unit heads performed certain administrative
functions for the units, such as validating timecards and preparing unit
reports, these tasks were found to be of a routine clerical nature.
Moreover, to the extent that the unit heads guided the work of legal
assistants and paralegals, this did not "confer supervisory status within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, but rather [was] an incident of
their professional responsibilities as attorneys and thereby as officers of
the court.' '4 The Board concluded that the unit heads were not
supervisors within the meaning of the Act.49
The Board further held that the unit heads were not managerial
employees. 0 Although the board of directors sometimes sought the
opinions of the unit heads, these attorneys played "at best an
informational or professional advisory role" and thus neither determined,
established, nor carried out management direction or policy. 5' The Board
42. See id. at 1270. Based on these activities, the parties stipulated, and the Board agreed, that
the attorneys, designated as "staff attorneys," were "professional employees" within the meaning of
the Act. They performed work that was "predominantly intellectual and varied in character,"
exercised "discretion and independent judgment in dealing with clients and handling legal
caseloads[,]" and had "completed courses of specialized study at institutions of higher learning
which they appl[ied] in their daily work." Id.
43. See id. at 1271-72.
44. See id. at 1272.
45. See NeighborhoodLegal Servs., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. at 1272.
46. Id. (referring to the language of the Act).

47. See id.
48. Id. at 1273.

49. See id.
50. See NeighborhoodLegal Servs., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. at 1273.

51. Id.
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explained:
It is clear from the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947 ...that managerial status is not conferred upon rank-and-file
workers, or upon those who perform routinely, but rather is reserved
for those in executive-type positions, those who are closely aligned
with management as true representatives of management...
professional employees plainly are not the same as management
employees either by definition or in authority, and managerial
authority is not vested in professional employees merely by virtue of
their professional status.52
In another decision involving legal aid lawyers, the Board
considered whether "supervising attorneys," as distinguished from
"managing attorneys," were supervisors within the meaning of the Act. 3
Both the "supervising attorneys" and the "managing attorneys" were
employed by a private nonprofit corporation offering legal assistance to
the poor in Maryland.54 According to their job description, the
supervising attorneys had responsibility for supervising managing
attorneys, legal assistants, and clerical employees; organizing the office
work; interviewing potential employees; and overseeing the caseloads of
junior associates and assessing their quality of work.55
The Board noted that the administration of the employees in the
units by the supervising attorneys was "indistinguishable from that
provided by managing attorneys," who were found not to be
supervisors.5 6 Both allocated work and provided the type of guidance
that senior attorneys lacking supervisory authority gave junior associates
and paralegals.' The Board found, however, that the supervising
attorneys had greater authority than the managing attorneys, and
identified two indicia of that authority.5 First, the supervising attorneys
had "authority 'responsibly to direct' employees" and exercised this
authority without seeking the approval of senior management. Second,
the supervising attomeys had the authority to recommend "the
52. Id. at 1273 (quoting Gen. Dynamics Corp., Convair Aerospace Div., San Diego
Operations, 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857-58 (1974)).
53. See Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., 319 N.L.R1B. 159, 160 (1995).
54. See id. For collective bargaining purposes, many of the employees of the Legal Aid
Bureau were represented by the National Organization of Legal Service Workers. See id.
55. See id. at 161.

56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See LegalAid Bureau, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at 162.
59. See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)).
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'discharge. . or discipline' of the employees in a situation that
'require[d] the use of independent judgment."'' The Board concluded
that "[t]hrough both the job description for the supervising attorney
position and the application process, persons selected by the Bureau to
be supervising attorneys [were] told that they [had] authority that [made]
them supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act."61
In Northwest Florida Legal Services, Inc.,62 the Board again
addressed the question of an attorney's status in a nonprofit legal
services organization. 6 The attorney, who was the head of a litigation
unit, wrote evaluations of a paralegal and a secretary, reviewed files, and
directed the work of her secretary. 4 The Board found that the "record as
a whole does not establish that [she] had the authority to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, reward, discipline, or adjust
grievances of other employees." '
Rather, her "exercise of
responsibilities in relation to other employees was routine in nature...
[and] [h]er direction of [the] work of nonprofessional employees was
that common in a professional situation." Ultimately, the Board
concluded that the attorney was not a supervisor because her duties were
not those included section 2(11) of the Act. 67
In the public sector, federal and state law determines when
attorneys and other professionals have the right to organize and
collectively bargain. 6' In a recent decision, attorneys employed by state
government agencies in Florida were given the right to bargain
collectively when the Florida Supreme Court struck down a 1994 law
which prohibited public sector attorneys from organizing. 69 The
employees were members of the State Employees Attorneys' Guild and
were employed in agencies such as the Department of Insurance, the
comptroller's office, Department of Transportation, and the Department
of Business and Professional Regulations." The court noted that
although "the state constitutional right to work provision contemplate[d]

60. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)).
61. Id. at 162-63.
62. 320 N.L.R.B. 92 (1995).
63. l. at 93-94.
64. See U at 93.
65. Id. (referring to the language of the Act).
66. Id.
67. See Northwest Fla.Legal Servs., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 93-94.
68. See Developments in the Law, supranote 10, at 1678-80.
69. See Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 1030, 1036 (Fla. 1999).
70. See Carol Marbin Miller, Fla.Attorneys Clear Way for Collective Bargaining, MIAMI
DAILY Bus. REv., May 28, 1999, at http:llwww.law.comlcgi-binlgx.cgilAppLog.
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legislative implementation... [t]he Legislature [could not] ...abridge
public employees' right to bargain collectively, absent a compelling
state interest making it necessary to do so."71 Moreover, the court
rejected the state's argument that allowing public sector attorneys to
unionize would jeopardize their loyalty to their employer.' Accordingly,
the court held that the state statute implementing a complete ban on all
public sector attorney collective bargaining was unconstitutional. 3 In
reaching its decision, the court noted that other jurisdictions "permit[ted]
state-employed attorneys to bargain collectively without any apparent
harm to the attorney-client relationship... [and that] [a]ttorneys
employed by the federal government," and by the NLRB itself, engage
in collective bargaining.7 4
In another case involving public sector employees, Chief Judge of
the Sixteenth Judicial Circuitv. Illinois State Labor Relations Board.,75
the Illinois Supreme Court held that assistant public defenders employed
by the circuit court were managerial employees and therefore not subject
to the collective bargaining provisions of the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act.7 In reaching its finding, the court stated that the assistant
public defenders possessed "significant authority and discretion to
discharge the mission of the public defender's office" and were, "[i]n
effect.... surrogates for the public defender." Specifically, the
assistant public defenders had independent judgment, participated in
promoting the goals of the public defender's office, and had professional
were "fundamentally identical to [those] of the public
interests that
78
defender."
These administrative and judicial rulings suggest the parameters of
the supervisory and managerial exceptions with respect to attorneys in
the private and public spheres. When they perform purely administrative
duties, have no power to discipline employees under their supervision,
lack policymaking authority and, in general, are not allied with the
interests of their employers, attorneys have the right to organize and
collectively bargain.
Among private sector attorneys, it seems clear that partners in law
firms, chief counsels of corporations, and chief attorneys in legal aid
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Chiles, 734 So. 2d at 1032-33.
See id. at 1034-35.
See id at 1037.
Id. at 1034-35.
1997).
687 N.E.2d 795 (Ill.
See id. at 798.
Id at 800.
Id. at 797.
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organizationswould not be covered under the NLRA. On the other hand,
staff attorneys employed under various job descriptions, private courtappointed counsel, and possibly even associates in law firms presumably
would be entitled to protection. In the public sector, although assistant
public defenders were found in one case to fall within the managerial
exception, it is likely that some attorneys employed in public defender's
offices would qualify as rank-and-file employees and thus be entitled to
protection under relevant state laws. Similarly, attorneys employed in
staff positions in government agencies presumably would belong on the
side of labor rather than that of management.
Although some attorneys in both the public and private spheres
clearly have the right to organize, it is possible that not all of them
would be inclined to resort to collective bargaining to obtain relief from
problems at work. After all, attorneys are professionals. Their workplace
problems are bound to be different from those of the industrial workers
for whom the NLRA was originally enacted. Associates at law firms, for
example, are likely to be concerned about issues such as the timing and
frequency of partnership decisions and increasing billable hour
requirements, hardly the traditional subjects of collective bargaining.
Yet, some attorneys work in conditions that are problematic in ways
comparable to those experienced by their counterparts in trade unions.
For these attorneys, collective bargaining and other concerted activities
may look like the answer.
In. THE NEED TO ORGANIZE
Under the NLRA, the duty to bargain requires the parties "to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 7 9 These topics of
mandatory bargaining constitute substantive workplace issues for many
rank-and-file attorneys. In particular, attorneys employed by legal aid
organizations, private court-appointed counsel, and staff attorneys in
public defender's offices are constantly beset by low wages, long hours,
and unsatisfactory working conditions. This Part identifies specific
problems facing attorneys in each of these groups.
A. Legal Aid Lawyers
Legal Aid lawyers work for private organizations that have
79. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
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contractual relationships with government entities. 80 Legal aid societies
typically are nonprofit organizations and exist to provide aid to indigent
clients.8 It is well known that underfunding is an ongoing problem for
legal aid societies.2 The situation in New York City illustrates the
severity of this problem.
In 1963, a state judiciary committee concluded that "[i]n our
judgment, the Legal Aid Society, Criminal Branch, is severely
overtaxed. ' Almost ten years later, in 1972, the Legal Aid Society's
Criminal Defense Division received only thirty-seven percent of the
funds that the district attorney's offices received, even though it
represented seventy-five percent of all defendants in New York City. 4 In
October 1982, the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys went on strike."
After ten weeks, the strike ended and a joint labor-management
committee was formed by contractual settlement. 6 In the following year,
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York issued a report
"which seemed to realize the odds against any positive steps being

taken. ,, 7

Despite the Legal Aid Association's plea, two years later, Legal
Aid attorneys had, on average, caseloads of 439 clients per year.8 In
October 1994, the attorneys went out on strike for the first time since
1982, following the expiration of a two-year collective bargaining
agreement." The union had voted to strike to increase wages and reduce
80. See STATE OF N.Y. JUDICIARY COMM. OF THE ASSEMBLY, REPORT ON ITS SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION OF THE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES IN THE CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF
Nmv YORK, ASSEMBLY 88-37, 186th Sess. at 15 (1963) [hereinafter SPECIAL INVESTIGATION].
81. Seeid.
82. See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render
the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 395 (1993) (noting the perpetual nature of
this problem for the New York Legal Aid Society).
83. SPECIAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 80, at 17.
84. See Klein, supranote 82, at 395.
85. See id. at 395-96.
86. See id. at 396 (noting that the committee was designed to improve working conditions).
87. Id. Professor Klein quotes from the 1968 Annual Report of the Administrative Board of
the Judicial Conference of New York:
This report is a pleaforattention to the essential needs of the Criminal Court of the City
of New York .... Because of the staggering volume of its caseload and its inability to
provide trials, the Criminal Court has been virtually incapacitated in the last few years.
Everyone exposed to the Court knows this-victims, defendants, witnesses, police
officers, lawyers on both sides, court personnel and judges.
Id. (alternations in original) (citation omitted).
88. See Stanley Penn, Seeking Justice: How Public Defenders Deal With the Pressureof the
Crowded Courts, WALL ST. J., July 5, 1985, § 1, at 1; see also Klein, supranote 82, at 396.
89. See New York Mayor Drops Legal Aid Society After Defense Attorneys Go Out on Strike,
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) A-12, A-12 (Oct. 5, 1994) [hereinafter New York Mayor].
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individual caseloads.e A spokesman for the Association of Legal Aid
Attorneys, the union that represents society lawyers, said at the time,
"[t]he society devotes only $40 million of its $140 million annual budget
to staff attorney salaries."91 The attorneys returned to work when they
were faced with threats from city officials and Mayor Giuliani of losing
their jobs.9
The following year, the mayor cut the Legal Aid Society's city
funding, "forcing the layoff of dozens of experienced lawyers and
drastically reducing training and supervision for the staff."" The mayor
also requested proposals from other criminal defense providers
throughout the city.94 As a result, and in response to concerns about fixed
price contracts awarded through competitive bidding, the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, First Department enacted a rule creating an
eight-member Indigent Defense Organization Oversight Committee."
The Committee was given the power "to monitor the provision of all
defense services in the First Department." In 1998, a New York Times
editorial observed:
The quality of legal services for New York City's poor defendants
continues to decline. The city has steadily reduced its contributions to
the Legal Aid Society, the main nonprofit agency providing
representation for indigent defendants, even as caseloads have
grown.... [Since the 1994 strike], City Hall has steadily cut Legal
Aid's funding from $79 million in 1994 to roughly $52 million [in
1998], based on the assumption that the agency's workload would drop
accordingly. But the decline did not materialize. Instead the agency has
been representing nearly the same number of clients for far fewer
dollars.... The average lawyer in the agency's Manhattan office is
assigned some 650 criminal cases a year, a breathtakingly high number
that makes proper representation extremely difficult if not impossible."

90. See id. ("The union [was] seeking 4.5 percent wage increases in each of the next two
years ....
);see also Adele Bernhard, PrivateBar Monitors Public Defense, CRiM. JUST., Spring
1998, at 25, 25 ("The confrontation between The Legal Aid Society (LAS) and the city began
when.., the lawyers' uniono voted to strike over.., a 15 percent increase in individual
caseloads.").
91. New York Mayor, supranote 89, at A-13.

92. See NY Legal Aid Lawyers Return, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 221, 221 (Oct. 17, 1994)
[hereinafter NYLegalAid.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Bernhard, supranote 90, at 25.
See id.
See id. at 26.
Id.
The Crisisat LegalAid, Editorial, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 1, 1998, at A24.
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More recently, in October 1999, lawyers employed by the Legal
Services of New York, a group of twelve New York City offices
providing legal aid to the poor, threatened to go out on strike if they did
not get a "significant pay hike."93 Two weeks earlier, the union
representing these legal services professionals had asked management
for a twelve percent pay increase." The union, known as the Legal
Services Staff Association, contended the pay raise was "crucial to halt
the defection of attorneys."' ° According to the co-president of the union,
the salary of a twenty-year legal services staff attorney will peak at
$65,000 per year, far less than the $80,000 earned by a legal aid attorney
with comparable experience.'O Management refused the union's request
for a twelve percent raise, instead offering a three percent increase, on

average. 0

B. Private Court-Appointed Counsel
Private counsel who represent poor defendants are appointed by
administrators, judges, or court clerks.'03 Administrators may provide
training or investigative services to appointed counsel and are
responsible for paying the attorneys' fees 3 4 Judges and court clerks keep
lists of attorneys who have volunteered to represent indigent defendants
and assign these attorneys to cases on a revolving basis.'9
Fees for private appointed counsel vary according to jurisdiction
and may differ depending on the type of work undertaken.' 6 In the
federal system, the Criminal Justice Act sets fees for court-appointed
counsel.'w At the state level, fees differ widely. For example, in
Colorado in 1991, court-appointed attorneys were paid between $45 and
$50 an hour for non-capital felony cases.' 3 Two years earlier, in 1989,
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.

Victoria Rivkin, Legal Services Union ThreatensStrike Monday, 222 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1999).

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.

103. See Klein, supra note 82, at 370.

104. See id.
105. See id.; see also Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor
in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 582, 901 (1986-87) (explaining that judges
and clerks assign cases to 18-B Panel attorneys who regularly represent indigent clients).
106. See Klein, supra note 82, at 371.

107. See iL; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (1994) (stating that an appointed attorney shall
receive not more than $60 an hour for in-court time and not more than $40 an hour for out-of-court

time).
108.

See Spangenberg Group, Non-Capital Felonies, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1990, at 45; Klein,
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California court-appointed attorneys were paid a maximum of $75 per
hour.'w Often states will not pay above a certain amount, regardless of
how many hours an attorney works on a case."o
According to the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association,
"after deducting the mean overhead in Oregon, where the hourly rate of
compensation for indigent defense work is $30 per hour (which is about
average nationally), a lawyer doing only indigent defense work [has] a
net annual income of just $72.00.'
A study done for the Joint
Subcommittee Studying Alternative Indigent Defense Systems for the
Virginia General Assembly and the Criminal Law Section of the
Virginia State Bar found that, in capital cases at trial, a sample of
Virginia attorneys
representing indigents were paid approximately $13
2
an hour."
In Louisiana, court-appointed counsel in death penalty cases
receive at most $1,000 per case." 3 In Alabama, attorneys are paid the
same amount for time spent preparing capital cases before trial."4 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court, in State v. Lynch,"5 found that a $3,200 fee
on a death penalty case was inadequate and "an unconstitutional taking
of private property."' 16 In 1987, the Rural Justice Center found that, in
some areas, attorneys are paid so little per hour that they cannot even
make back their costs for the representation."'
C. PublicSector Lawyers
The problem of inadequate wages also plagues attorneys in the
public sector."' To say that the wage problem is critical is to
underestimate its effect." 9 Budget cuts are strapping public defender's
supra note 82, at 371.

109. See Edward C. Monahan, Attorneys Must Be PaidFairly,CIuM. JUST., Summer 1990, at
16,43.
110.
111.
1989, at
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Klein, supranote 82, at 371.
Nancy Gist, Assigned Counsel: Is the RepresentationEffective?, CQUM. JUST., Summer
16, 19 (discussing a 1986 survey).
Seeid. atl8.
See Klein, supra note 82, at 366.
See id. at 366-67.
796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
Id. at 1153.
See Mark Curriden, Indigent Defense in the South: Begging for Justice, 77 A.B.A. J. 64,

67 (1991).
118. See, e.g., John B. Arango, Defense Services for the Poor, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1995, at
37, 38 (discussing the low starting salaries of staff attorney public defenders).
119. See, e.g., Cary B. Willis, Judge's Bid to Aid Public Defender May Face Legal Test,
COrRtER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 6, 1992, at 1 (explaining that a lack of money for the public
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offices nationwide, resulting in salaries of less than $26,000 a year for
some public sector attorneys.' The project coordinator of the ABA's
Bar Information Program has noted that public defender's offices
throughout the country are inadequately funded and, with few
exceptions, are beginning to feel the effects.' 2 ' In addition to poor pay
rates, public sector attorneys generally have a substandard benefits
package.'2
Excessive caseloads also add to public defenders' problems."z The
indications are that this problem is getting worse instead of better.'24 The
statistics associated with the caseloads of public defenders are
staggering.' "While the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards recommends that a public defender close no more than
150 cases a year, [one public defender] had already closed 476 in the
first 10 months of 1990. ' 26 In 1992, the Jefferson County Public
Defender's office in Kentucky had thirty-one public defenders and
handled 54,000 cases, requiring each defender to handle more than 150
cases at any given time, more than double the acceptable standard.'
"[I]n Atlanta, the two dozen public defenders have caseloads of more
than 500 each, with some approaching 700 [and] [s]upport staff for these
overburdened lawyers is deplorably inadequate."'" The situation
prompted one Atlanta public defender to comment: "I used to look hard
for the one issue that I could use to win the case[;] I now look for the
one issue that I can find to dispose of the case."' 29
In addition to being overworked and underpaid, public sector
attorneys also face poor working conditions.3 Specifically, attorneys
have sought to negotiate for larger libraries, updated computers and
3
access to online legal research, as well as law clerks and paralegals.1 1

defender's office caused a breakdown in the system and that indigent defendants were being denied
their constitutional right to counsel).
120. See id.; see also Arango, supranote 118, at 38.
121. See Klein, supra note 82, at 393.
122. See Miller, supranote 70.
123. See Klein, supranote 82, at 393. In some places, public defenders spend only ten minutes
on a case because of their enormous caseloads. See Richard Shumate, "IWill Not Accept Any More
Cases," BARISTER MAG., Winter 1991-92, at 11, 11.
124. See Klein, supra note 82, at 393.
125. See Shumate, supra note 123, at 11.
126. Id
127. See Willis, supranote 119.
128. Monroe Freedman, Third WorldJustice,LEGAL TMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at 1.
129. Id.
130. See Miller, supranote 70.
131. See id.
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According to the attorney representing the State Employees Attorneys
Guild in Florida, "[tihey don't expect what you make in a private
they reasonably aspire... they just
firm... that's not the level to which
32
conditions."'
working
better
want
While attorneys who represent indigent defendants face problems
comparable to those experienced by nonprofessional employees, they
also encounter a type of workplace problem that lies outside the
traditional area of mandatory bargaining.
IV. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: BEYOND MANDATORY BARGAINING
As noted above, in Part II, professional employees engage in
activities that reflect their capacity for independent judgment and their
high level of education and training.'33 Thus, they seek to influence the
policies of the organizations that employ them, to participate in the
establishment of professional standards, and to comment on the proper
allocation of institutional resources.TM These employment issues fall
outside the traditional scope of mandatory bargaining. Yet, while
lawyers have values and interests similar to those of other professional
employees, they also have concerns unique to their profession. These are
best identified and understood in terms of the rules regulating lawyers'
behavior. Every attorney, whether employed by a government agency, a
legal aid organization, or in the private sector, is bound by strict ethical
obligations. These are set forth in state bar associations' rules of
professional conduct, which are patterned on the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"). Part IV will discuss, first, the
positions taken by the American Bar Association's Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility ("ABA Committee") concerning
attorney membership in unions and, second, ethical considerations
facing attorneys in the workplace.
A. ABA Committee Opinions on UnionActivity by Lawyers
Until recently, the legal profession has been opposed to attorneys
132. Id.

133. See supranotes 8-78 and accompanying text.
134. See Rabban, American Labor Law, supra note 2, at 691. The author notes, specifically,
"the participation of musicians in the personnel decisions of orchestras ... adherence by hospitals to
standards of nursing practice developed by the American Nurses' Association, [and] controls by
reporters on revisions of their articles." Id. at 715 (citations omitted).
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joining unions or other employee associations. The Model Code,'35
which was adopted by the American Bar Association in 1969, contains
no disciplinary rule that specifically prohibits membership by lawyers in
unions or associations representing lawyers.'36 However, in 1947, PreModel Code Opinion 275 prohibited a lawyer who was employed full
time by a casualty insurance company from joining a union created by
claim adjusters, many of whom were lawyers.' According to the
opinion, allowing the lawyer to join a union could lead to violations of
rules concerning client loyalty and confidentiality.' The opinion further
held that "to permit an outside group such as a union to fix a fee
schedule by concerted action would violate... Canon 12 (fees)."'39
In 1966, the ABA Committee determined that a government lawyer
could not join a labor union. ' 40 As the ABA Committee explained, a
lawyer employed by a government agency owes it his "undivided
loyalty."'4' If he were to join a labor union, he would have an obligation
to the union, which might conflict with his obligation to his client."2 In
that instance, the lawyer would be "surrendering his independent
judgment" and would become "subject to the direction of the union and
its officers.' 4 3 The ABA Committee concluded that a lawyer should
never be in such a position.44
One year later, however, the ABA Committee reversed its
opinion.'4 5 In Informal Opinion 986, it was held that salaried, employeelawyers could join a union or organization to negotiate wages and
working conditions, but that they could not strike or withhold their

135. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1983). The Model Code, which replaced the
ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics, was approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August of
1969. By 1980, a Code of Professional Responsibility, patterned after the ABA Model Code, had
been adopted by nearly every state. Since 1983, however, more than 35 states have adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct The Model Code has not been amended since then and the
ABA does not plan to amend it in the future. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION
OF LAVYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 447-48 (Aspen Law & Business 1999).
136. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325 (1975).
137. See id.
138. See id. (referring to Pre-Code Canons 35 (intermediaries) and 37 (client confidences)).
139. Id.
140. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 917 (1966); see also
Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142, 1160 (Cal. 1994)
(forbidding attorneys from unionizing).
141. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 917 (1966).
142.
143.
144.
145.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 986 (1967).
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services in any way." Another condition of membership was that the
union be independent of unions representing non-lawyers.'
This
became the pre-Model Code attitude toward union membership.
Following adoption of the Model Code, the ABA Committee again
took up the question of the ethical propriety of attorney membership in a
union. In Informal Opinion 1325, the ABA Committee explained that
the Model Code gives ethical guidance concerning union membership in
EC 5-13. 4 EC 5-13 provides:
A lawyer should not maintain membership in or be influenced by any
organization of employees that undertakes to prescribe, direct, or
suggest when or how he should fulfill his professional obligations to a
person or organization that employs him as a lawyer. Although it is not
necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a corporation or similar
entity to be a member of an organization of employees, he should be
vigilant to safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employer, free from
outside influences. 49
According to the ABA Committee, this provision expresses a
concern that a lawyer belonging to a union is likely to be confronted
with a choice between participating in certain union activities and
violating certain disciplinary rules. 5 In this context, the ABA
Committee refers specifically to "DR 6-101(A)(3), proscribing neglect
of a legal matter entrusted to a lawyer, DR 7-101(A)(2), forbidding a
lawyer to intentionally fail to carry out a contract for employment with a
client, and DR 7-101(A)(3), prohibiting a lawyer to intentionally
prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional
relationship."' 5'
Regarding strikes and other collective bargaining matters, the ABA
Committee takes a pragmatic approach. 2 Thus, in some circumstances,
an attorney who participates in a strike could "neglect a legal matter
entrusted to [him]," thereby violating a disciplinary rule.' 53 In other
situations, however, participating in a strike might be "no more
disruptive of the performance of legal work than taking a two week's

146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325 (1975).
149. MODEL CODE OFPROF'LREsPONSEBiLrryEC 5-13 (1983).
150. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325 (1975).

151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
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vacation might be."'-' In short, in any case of possible violation of a
disciplinary rule by a striking attorney, issues of fact will be involved.
B. Ethical Considerations
In interpreting EC 5-13, the ABA Committee draws attention to
disciplinary rules connected with the Model Code's Canon 6, "A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Competently,"' 155 and Canon 7, "A Lawyer
15 6
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."'
The ethical obligation to represent clients competently and zealously
identifies an area of particular concern for lawyers. However, for
lawyers employed by legal aid organizations and certain government
entities, and as court-appointed counsel, meeting these and other ethical
obligations may pose special workplace problems. The following
example will illustrate this difficulty.
A New Orleans public defender, Rick Teissier, refused to go to trial
when there was not enough money available in the system to pay for the
testimony of an expert witness. 57 He was subsequently cited for
contempt "and took the unusual step of asking the judge to find that,
under the circumstances, he was incapable of providing his client an
there is
effective defense."'158 In his motion he stated: "With no 15experts,
9
assured.'
is
conviction
defendant's
the
no need for trial;
Ethics rules require that lawyers provide adequate and competent
representation. DR 6-101(A)(1) of the Model Code states that "[a]
lawyer shall not [h]andle a legal matter which he knows or should know
that he is not competent to handle. ' 6 DR 6-101(A)(3) states that "[a]
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to [him].,61 What
happens when a staff defender, like Rick Teissier, determines that he can
handle no more cases without violating these ethics rules and his clients'
constitutional rights? Should he refuse to go to trial, as Teissier did, or
should he continue on the job in violation of his ethical obligations and,
perhaps, the dictates of his conscience?
In Teissier's case, the decision to comply with the ethics rules had

154. Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSBIrY Canon 6 (1983).
MODEL CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983).
See Mark Hansen, P.D. FundingStruck Down, A.B.A. J., 18,18 (1992).
Id.

159. Id.
160. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSiBmiLY DR 6-101(A)(1) (1983).
161. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBmTY DR 6-101(A)(3) (1983).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

19

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 6
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 18:299

an unusual outcome 6 2 The judge declared the city's entire indigent
defense program unconstitutional and ordered the state to come up with
a way to pay for eleven new public defenders, sixteen more employees, a
law library and a separate expert witness fund.' 63 The judge also said he
would cut Teissier's caseload in half and assign private practice lawyers
to the public defender program's lesser felony and misdemeanor cases.'
Teissier's response to the situation at the New Orleans public
defender's office turned out to be an effective choice under the
circumstances. However, lawyers who attempt to remedy deplorable
work conditions rarely meet with such success. More often, they are
forced to violate ethics rules or risk being fired. 65 A 1975 opinion of the
New York County Bar Association's Committee on Legal Ethics
("Committee") further illustrates the problem."6
The opinion addressed the question of whether it is ethically proper
for legal aid society lawyers to engage in a strike. 67 The lawyers were
striking for better hours, higher pay, and improved working conditions,
as well as changes in the society's representation system." The union
representing the Legal Aid Society lawyers contended that it was
impossible for them to render proper legal representation of their clients
because of the society's practice of having different lawyers represent
the same client at successive stages of a case.'69 This practice, the union
held, deprived the client of the "continuous personal representation to
which he [was] entitled."'' 0 Moreover, in criminal cases, the lawyers met
with their clients under conditions that lacked the privacy necessary for
discussions of confidences and secrets. 7 '
The New York Code of Professional Responsibility ("New York
Code"), a version of the Model Code, contains the following provision:
"A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if
required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment... if... [t]he
lawyer knows or it is obvious that continued employment will result in
162. See Hansen, supra note 157, at 18.
163. See id.

164. See id.
165. See, e.g., Shumate, supra note 123, at 11-12 (noting how one attorney's motion for fewer
cases resulted in transfer from the Atlanta public defender's office).
166. See Op. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics: The N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n No. 645 (June 2,

1975).
167. See id.
168.

See id.

169. See id.
170. Id.
171. See Op. Comm. on Prof I Ethics: The N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n No. 645 (June 2,

1975).
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violation of a Disciplinary Rule.' ' 72 DR 1-102(A)(5) of the New York
Code states that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.' ' 173 The Committee found that
this duty took precedence over any right of the lawyers to strike.' 74
However, the fragmentation of services caused by the practice of
assigning different lawyers to the same client at various stages of a
proceeding, made it impossible for the lawyers to avoid engaging in the
conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice" as required by the
New York Code. 75 Moreover, under these conditions, the lawyers were
unable to render proper legal representation of their clients, and were
thereby violating the disciplinary rules requiring a lawyer to represent a
client competently. These rules forbid a lawyer from handling "a legal
matter which the lawyer knows or should know that he or she is not
competent to handle,"'7 6 and from handling a legal matter "without
preparation adequate in the circumstances.' ' 77 Therefore, under the rule
governing mandatory withdrawal, the lawyers of the Legal Aid Society
arguably had no option but to "withdraw," that is, strike, since continued
employment would result in a violation of the New York Code.
Similarly, since the conditions under which they worked made it
impossible for the lawyers to consult with their clients in privacy, the
lawyers were unable to continue in their employment without violating
the rule forbidding them knowingly to "[r]eveal a confidence or secret of
a client."'7' Hence, under the rule governing mandatory withdrawal, the
lawyers were required to withdraw. The same logic would apply in the
case of the rules concerning zealous representation. Thus, if the lawyers
were to comply with the rules forbidding them intentionally to "[f]ail to
carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client ' ' 171 or
"[p]rejudice or damage the client during the course of the professional
relationship,"'' ° they would, again, be compelled to withdraw from
employment under the New York Code.
The Society's system for providing legal representation may also
cause a conflict of interest between a lawyer and her clients. Canon 5 of
172. N. Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBLTY DR 2-1 10(B)(2) (1996).
173. N. Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSmIiY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1996).
174. See Op. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics: The N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n No. 645 (June 2,

1975).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

N. Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.
N. Y.
N.Y.
N. Y.

CODE OF PROF'L RESPoNsmrY
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSmILrY
CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY
CODE OF PROF'L RESPoNsIBILiY
CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY
CODE OFPROF'LRESPONSEBiLrrY

DR 1-102(A)(5)
DR 6-101(A)(1)
DR 6-101(A)(2)
DR 4-101(B)(1)
DR 7-101(A)(2)
DR 7-101(A)(3)
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the New York Code is: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent
Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."'' When an attorney has
more clients than she can properly represent, there is a reasonable
likelihood that her independent professional judgment will be impaired.
She may, for example, be forced to choose between clients, to decide
which ones she will help and which she will let go to jail with a guilty
plea.
The Committee, in its opinion, did not question the right of lawyers
to join a labor union, nor did it question whether the lawyers had the
legal right to strike.' The Committee stated, however, that "the right to
strike is not an absolute and wholly unrestricted right exercisable
irrespective of rights possessed by others."'83 The Committee concluded,
"staff lawyers of a legal aid society cannot ethically exercise their right
to strike if doing so either disrupts the proper functioning of the courts
and the judicial system or deprives indigent defendants of their right to
proper representation and a speedy trial."'
The opinion of the Committee to the contrary notwithstanding, the
Legal Aid Society lawyers not only had the ethical right to strike: it
would have been unethical for them not to strike. That is, in the
circumstances, it was impossible for the lawyers to comply with the
ethics rules of their jurisdiction without withdrawing from employment,
here, engaging in a strike. The Committee pointed to the fact that the
lawyers had duties "to the judicial system, to the public and to clients
[that took] precedence over any right of the lawyers to strike against
their employer."' However, the Committee's position overlooks the fact
that by denying lawyers the ethical right to strike, they effectively
perpetuate a system in which those duties will be abrogated.
In the examples discussed so far, attorneys risked facing adverse
consequences at the hands of their employers as a result of trying to
meet their ethical obligations to their clients. Their attempts to gain
benefits at work were contemplated or undertaken with the clients'
interests in mind. But what if the client is the employer?
As noted above, the American Bar Association's Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility has determined that a lawyer may
join a union without thereby violating a disciplinary rule. 186 Under Model
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

N. Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1996).
See N. Y. County B. Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 645 (1975).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See discussion, supra, Part V.A.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss1/6

22

Midwood and Vitacco: The Right of Attorneys to Unionize, Collectively Bargain, and Str
Right ofAttorneys

2000]

Code provision EC 5-13, while it is not improper for a lawyer to be a
member of an organization of employees, he should be "vigilant to
safeguard his fidelity" to the employer.'87 Suppose that a public
employee wants to sue his employer in the course of a wage dispute. Can
he do so without failing to safeguard his fidelity to the employer? At
least one state supreme court has considered this question.'
In California, attorneys employed in the office of the Santa Clara
County Counsel attempted to sue the Santa Clara Board of
Supervisors.' The California Supreme Court considered, inter alia,
whether the attorneys' duty of loyalty toward their client prevented such
a suit. 9' The court concluded that it did not.' 9'
A fundamental issue posed by the case was the extent to which the
collective bargaining relationship between an attorney/employee and a
client/employer is itself compatible with the attorney's duty of loyalty.'92
The court found that "government attorneys who organized themselves
into associations pursuant to statute and who proceeded to bargain
collectively with their employer/clients [were not] per se in violation of
any duty of loyalty or any other ethical obligation."' 93 The Court further
stated, "[t]he growing phenomenon of the lawyer/employee requires a
realistic accommodation between an attorney's professional obligations
and the fights he or she may have as an employee."'94 At the same time,
the court noted, an attorney cannot assert his or her fights as an
employee so far as to transgress ethical boundaries, such as the rules
requiring competence and confidentiality.' 95
The obligations to serve the client competently, zealously, and
faithfully, to promote the administration of justice, and to safeguard the
client's confidences, may be impossible without decent pay, reasonable
workloads, and adequate support staff and facilities. Lawyers whose
workplace problems include the fundamental issues of wages, hours, and
conditions of employment have not only the need to improve their
187.
188.

MODEL CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSMLTY EC 5-13 (1983).
See Santa Clara County Council Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142 (Cal.

1994).
189.

See id. at 1144-45. The County Counsel was the primary legal adviser to the Board. See

id. at 1145.
190. See id. at 1144.
191. See id.
192. See Santa ClaraCounty AttorneysAss'n, 869 P.2d at 1155.
193. U at 1157.
194. Id.
195. See id. For example, the court noted that "in pursuing rights of self-representation, [an
attorney] may not use delaying tactics in handling existing litigation or other matters of
representation for the purpose of gaining advantage in a dispute over salary and fringe benefits." Id.
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working conditions, but also the legal and ethical right to attempt to do
so. Union membership, collective bargaining and concerted action are
ways in which lawyers can achieve their professional goals.
V. STRATEGIES AND PROPOSALS

This Note has considered when lawyers have the right to organize
and the conditions under which they might need to organize. This Part
discusses ways in which lawyers who belong to unions can use their
organizational power to achieve their goals in the workplace.
A. Strikes
It was suggested, above, that in some circumstances, lawyers have
not only the legal right, but also an ethical obligation to strike. Certainly,
it is true that without at least the legal right to strike, the right to
collectively bargain has little significance. However, engaging in a strike
can be problematic. Under the NLRA, although strikes over mandatory
subjects are protected, strikes over permissive subjects are not. '
Additionaly, strikes by public employees are illegal under any
circumstances in most public sector jurisdictions.' Moreover, as the
New York Legal Aid Society lawyers found in 1994, strikes are not
always effective.'98 An opinion by the Supreme Court suggests that they
may also be costly and counterproductive.
In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,'99 the Court found
that a strike by court-appointed counsel violated federal antitrust laws.2®
Specifically, the concerted efforts of the attorneys to increase their wage
rates was found to be in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act ("FTC Act").20' The FTC Act makes it illegal for
anyone to use unfair or deceptive competition techniques in
commerce. = The FTC Act states that: "[u]nfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." '
In the District of Columbia, two groups of attorneys are responsible
196. See Rabban, American Labor Law, supranote 2, at 693.
197. See Developments in the Law, supranote 10, at 1702-04.
198. See NYLegalAid, supranote 92, at 221.
199. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).

200. See id. at 436.
201. See id.
at 414, 428.

202. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994).
203. Id

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss1/6

24

Midwood and Vitacco: The Right of Attorneys to Unionize, Collectively Bargain, and Str

2000]

Right of Attorneys

for indigent defense.20 Full-time public defenders represent the
defendants accused of the most serious felonies.Y5 Attorneys in private
practice represent the majority of the remaining criminal defendants, in
accordance with the District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act
("DCCJA")Y0 6 The DCCJA governs the appointment and compensation
of private sector attorneys representing the indigent.m Approximately
eighty-five percent of the 25,000 indigent criminal defendants are
represented by these private practice attorneys.208
While 1,200 private attorneys were registered for indigent
representation appointment in 1982, only about 100 of these attorneys
actually represented clients on a regular basis.2 The income of these
"regular" attorneys comes primarily from representing indigents.210 The
attorneys earned $30 per hour for in-court time and $20 per hour for outof-court time, in accordance with District of Columbia statutes.2" They
had been protesting these pay rates for several years prior to taking the
action at issue in this case.21 2
In 1982, these "regulars," the core of the Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Association ("SCTLA"), joined with other associations to try to
persuade government officials to raise their pay rates. 2 3 These attorneys
wanted wage rates to be increased to $35 per hour, with an ultimate
increase to $45 per hour for in-court time and $55 per hour for out-ofcourt time.2 4 Subsequently, an SCTLA committee was created which
determined that previous peaceful attempts to change the status quo had
been and would continue to be unsuccessful.2 5 Thus, it decided "that the
only viable way of getting an increase in fees was to stop signing up to
,,211
take new ... appointments.
The members of the SCTLA agreed with the committee's
determination and agreed to strike on September 6, 1983, if wage

204. See Superior Court Trial lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at414-15.
205. See id. at 414.
206. See id. at 415. Furthermore, in a few cases, third-year law students or uncompensated
private counsel represented indigent defendants. See id at 415 n.2.
207. See id. at 415.
208. See Superior CourtTrial LawyersAss'n, 493 U.S. at 414-15.
209. See id. at 415.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See Superior CourtTrial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 415.
214. See iL at 415-16.
215. Seeid at416.
216. Id. (quoting In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 538 (1986)).
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increases were not granted. 7 The District of Columbia denied the wage
increases.211 In response, ninety percent of the private attorneys who
regularly represented indigent clients refused to take on any new

clients. 29' As a result, there developed an immense backlog of cases

requiring immediate investigation and preparation, for which there was
no effective contingency plan.m Consequently, the District of Columbia
was forced to acquiesce to the demands of the striking attorneys.?'
Although the strike was successful, three months later the Federal

Trade Commission ("FTC") filed a complaint against SCTLA, which
stated that the attorneys had "'entered into an agreement among
themselves and with other lawyers to restrain trade by refusing to
compete for or accept new appointments under the [DC]CJA program
beginning on September 6, 1983, unless and until the District of
Columbia increased the fees offered under the [DC]CJA program."' ' At
an initial hearing, an administrative law judge found that the FTC's
accusations had merit, but recommended dismissal because no harm was
done. 3 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found that the

court-appointed counsel had acted as competitors, but concluded that the
217. See id.
[A]bout 100... lawyers met and resolved not to accept any new cases after September 6
[1983] if legislation providing for an increase in their fees had not passed by that date.
Immediately following the meeting, they prepared (and most of them signed) a petition
stating:
We, the undersigned private criminal lawyers practicing in the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia, agree that unless we are granted a substantial increase in
our hourly rate we will cease accepting new appointments under the Criminal
Justice Act.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 416 (quoting Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n
v. FFC, 276, 856 F.2d 226,230 (1988)) (citation omitted).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 417.
221. Seeid.at418.
Within ten days, the key figures in the District's criminal justice system "became
convinced that the system was on the brink of collapse because of the refusal of
[DC]CJA lawyers to take on new cases." On September 15, they hand-delivered a letter
to the Mayor describing why the situation was expected to "reach a crisis point" by early
the next week and urging the immediate enactment of a bill increasing all [DC]CJA rates
to $35 per hour. The Mayor promptly met with the members of the strike committee and
offered to support an immediate temporary increase to the $35 level as well as a
subsequent permanent increase to $45 an hour for out-of-court time and $55 for in-court
time.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 544) (alteration in original).
222. Id. (quoting In re Superior Court TrialLawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 511).
223. See id. at 419.
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SCTLA boycott contained an element of expression that deserved First
Amendment protection.' 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.'m
Finding that the attorneys had violated the FTC's prohibition
against unfair trade practices because they had successfully fixed prices
for their services,. 6 the Court noted that it did not matter whether the
price-fixing was for a "good or bad" purpose.' Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens found the political motive of a price-fixing agreement to
be of no consequence, and rejected the attorneys' claim that the boycott
was a form of political expression entitled to First Amendment
protection." The decision of the court of appeals was reversed "insofar
as that court held the per se rules inapplicable to the lawyers' boycott"
and the case was remanded2 9
The Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n poses a significant obstacle to attorneys seeking to
improve work conditions and protect the interests of their clients by
means of concerted action. As one commentator stated:
The Supreme Court's decision is a major setback to counsel
representing the indigent defendant. As was true with the SCTLA
lawyers, a strike would, in any event, be only a matter of last resort.
Court-appointed counsel have few options. In addition, indigent
defendants have no political clout and few politicians dare to advocate
the allocation of additional funds for their legal representation. In this
era of governmental deficits and cuts in expenditures at the county,
state, and federal levels, the problems of counsel are steadily becoming
exacerbated. If those representing the indigent cannot unite to fight for
more funding to protect the constitutional rights of their clients, the
criminal justice system as a whole is sure to suffer. 31
An alternative to concerted action is the modification of labor laws
to accommodate the needs of professional employees.
B. Attorneys and American LaborLaw
As noted above, in Part II, professional employees tend to have
greater training, responsibility, autonomy and discretion than
224. See id. at 420.
225. See id. at 421.
226. See Superior CourtTrial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 422-23.
227. See id. at 424.

228. See id.
229.
230.

Id at 436.
Klein, supranote 82, at 388-89 (citations omitted).
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nonprofessional employees."3 As a result, they have different
professional goals. 2 This distinction has led to a concern that, if
professional employees unionize, they may sacrifice their essential
professional values.23 This view reflects recognition that American labor
law, which developed in response to industrial sector collective
bargaining, involves assumptions that conflict with or at least fail to
accommodate the concerns of professional employees.Z
It has been suggested that if certain traditional doctrines associated
with American labor law were modified, attorneys in both the private
and public sectors would be better able to develop a system of collective
bargaining that promotes professional values.25 By abolishing the
distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining,
and by modifying the traditional doctrines of exclusive representation
and company domination, unions and employers might develop a system
of collective bargaining compatible with attorneys' professional goals. 6
The following discussion outlines one such proposal.
1. The Scope of Bargaining
The NLRA of 1935 did not define the scope of collective
bargaining. 27 However, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments added a
provision specifying that the duty to bargain requires the parties to meet
and confer "in good faith" with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms
or conditions of employment." 23 Against the advice of some
commentators, the NLRB and the courts have construed the phrase,
"terms or conditions of employment," in a way that maintains the
distinction between "mandatory" and "permissive" subjects of
bargaining that was first developed in interpretations of the Wagner
Act.29 The Supreme Court endorsed this approach in NLRB v. Wooster
231. See Rabban, DistinguishingExcludedManagers,supra note 11, at 1793.
232. See Rabban, American Labor Law, supranote 2, at 691. Doctors and nurses, for example,
seek to improve the nature of health care in hospitals. University professors want guarantees of
academic freedom. And, as discussed earlier in this Note, legal aid attorneys negotiate for the
chance to render proper legal representation and for adequate facilities in which to counsel their
clients. See id.
233. See Henry Mintzberg, A Note on the Unionizationof Professionalsfrom the Perspective
of OrganizationTheory, 5 INDuS. REL. L. 623, 631 (1983).
234. See id. at 632; see also Rabban, American LaborLaw, supranote 2, at 692.
235. See Rabban,American Labor Law, supra note 2, at 693-94.
236. See id.
237. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
238. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
239. See Rabban, American Labor Law, supra note 2, at 703; Theodore J.St. Antoine, Legal
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Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 4° holding that the duty to bargain in
good faith extends only to mandatory subjects. 24' Either party may
propose additional subjects in negotiations but the other party need not
bargain about them. 24 2 Insistence on the resolution of a non-mandatory
subject as a condition to an overall agreement violates the duty to
bargain in good faith.243 Subsequent litigation over the scope of
bargaining reveals "that labor boards and courts in both the private and
public sectors have defined only a relatively narrow range of
professional concerns as mandatory subjects of bargaining."2 4
In the public sector, some state legislation governing collective
bargaining contains "meet and confer" provisions, which are intended to
expand the scope of bargaining.24 5 Under these provisions, an employer
must "meet and confer" with representatives of employees about
professional concerns that are permissive subjects of bargaining. 46
However, these provisions often are unsuccessful because they are
considered to be ineffective or indistinguishable from collective
bargaining.247
In light of the fact that many issues of concern for professionals are
excluded from the mandatory sphere, it has been recommended that
"[t]he distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of
bargaining should be abolished in the context of professional
employment." 2"' The distinction makes it difficult to preserve
professional values during collective bargaining.249 Professional
employees, especially attorneys, have a "legitimate and socially useful
role to play in determining policies related to their professional
expertise, whether or not these policies affect narrowly defined terms of
Barriersto Worker Participationin ManagementDecisionMaking, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1301, 1304-05

(1984).
240. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
241. See id. at 349.
242. See id
243. See id.
244. Rabban, American Labor Law, supra note 2, at 705. It is primarily the unions of public
school teachers and university professors that have challenged the mandatory/permissive distinction.
Issues defined as outside the scope of mandatory bargaining include student-faculty ratio, policies
on academic freedom and professional ethics, curriculum, and decisions to hire, promote, and award
tenure. Clearly mandatory subjects include supplementary employment, salary, and rules governing
travel out of state. See id.
245. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2(c) (West 1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
965(1) (West 1964).
246. See Rabban, American Labor Law, supranote 2, at 709.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 711.
249. See id.
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employment."2 0 In fact, "most professionals consider input into such
policy issues an important condition of professional employment.""'
2. Exclusive Representation
Section 9(a) of the NLRA requires that a union selected by the
majority in an appropriate unit of employees be the exclusive bargaining
representative for all employees in the unit regarding wages, hours, and
other conditions of employment. 2 After the selection of an exclusive
representative, "employers are precluded from bargaining about these
subjects with anyone else." 3
The elimination of the distinction between mandatory and
permissive subjects of bargaining would require a simultaneous
loosening of the principle of exclusive representation.2 Where
employers are required to bargain with union representatives, strict
adherence to the doctrine of exclusive representation would impose
limits on independent contacts between employers and employees unless
the union allows them. 5 Consequently, exclusive union representation
would preempt important discussions about professional issues
concerning attorneys.
3. Company Domination
In order for attorneys to effectively bargain, the doctrine of
company domination also needs to be modified in the context of
professional employment. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA states that it is
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it.' ' 6 Not every employee group is
However, Supreme Court
considered a "labor organization." '

250. Id. at 712.
251. Rabban, American LaborLaw, supranote 2, at 712.

252. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
defines

Rabban, American LaborLaw, supranote 2, at 723.
See id. at 694.
See id.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
See Rabban, American Labor Law, supra note 2, at 740. Section 2(5) of the NLRA
a "labor organization" as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee

representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose,
in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
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interpretations of this provision stress that any continuing body of
employees is "dominated unless it is entirely free from employer support
or influence." 5
Committees of professional employees, such as trial attorney
associations, need the support of employers, which would violate section
8(a)(2).29 Attorneys and their employers should be allowed to choose
these committee structures as an alternative to collective bargaining. The
employers of attorneys "should have discretion to establish such
structures as long as they do not manipulate them to avoid
unionization."
In short, modifications in the principles of exclusive representation
and company domination, together with the elimination of the
distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of collective
bargaining, would promote the application of labor law to professionals
such as attorneys.
C. InterestArbitration
A third strategy open to attorneys who seek to unionize is interest
arbitration. Interest arbitration provides an alternative to striking.26' Such
arbitration is already in use in some areas of labor law." 2 For example, in
New York, where police officers and firefighters are forbidden to strike,
this type of arbitration has been used to prevent work stoppages.23 It has
been argued that interest arbitration is an effective alternative to
concerted action.26
Interest arbitration presents an alternative to striking when attempts
to bargain have reached an impasse.2 Ordinarily, employers and
employees negotiate in an attempt to settle their disputes.2 When a
settlement cannot be reached, employers and employees sometimes
258. Rabban, American Labor Law, supranote 2, at 740.

259. See id. at 754.
260. Id.
261. See Arvid Anderson & Loren A. Krause, Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the
Strike, 56 FORDHAi L. REV. 153, 153 (1987).
262. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (Michie 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11 (1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 (West 1993); Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14 (Anderson 1995);
OR. REV. STAT. § 243.742 (1998); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.2002 (West 1995); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1733 (1987).
263. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. § 209(2) (1999). This statute is the model used for the following
discussion.
264. See Anderson & Krause, supranote 261, at 153.
265. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. § 209(1).
266. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. § 209(2).
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resort to an independent mediator in an effort to reach resolution. 6 '
Mediators try to bring the parties together by proposing solutions to the
conflict.a
When a mediator fails to resolve a dispute, employers and
employees in some cases appeal to fact-finding commissions269 Such
commissions have access to the documents of both parties and present
their findings as to the issues in dispute.'7 If a party objects to one of the
findings, it is given an opportunity to file an exception, which the
commission will consider before issuing a final report."'
If none of these methods is successful, an interest arbitration may
occur.1 2 An interest arbitration is a hearing in which both sides argue
their respective positions.l 3 A panel of arbitrators then determines the
outcome of the dispute. 4 Normally, panels consist of three arbitrators,
and consider three factors when making their decisions.2 s First, they
compare "wages, hours[,] and conditions of employment of the
employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours,
and conditions of employment of other employees performing similar
services or requiring similar skills under similar working conditions and
with other employees generally in public and private employment in
comparable communities. '' 6 Secondly, they consider the ability of the
employer to accommodate the employees' demands.'m Finally, they
examine the terms of agreements negotiated between the parties in the
pasti2 8 The panels also have the authority to examine other relevant
information and to insert binding clauses into collective bargaining
agreements.f 9 Review of decisions is granted upon clear and convincing
267. See N.Y. CIrv. SERv. § 209(3)(a). "[T]o assist the parties to effect a voluntary resolution
of the dispute, the board shall appoint a mediator or mediators representative of the public from a
list of qualified persons." Id.
268. See Deborah A. Schmedemann, Reconciling Differences: The Theory and Law of
Mediating Labor Grievances,9 INDUS. REL. W. 523, 532 (1987).
269. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. § 209(3)(b).

270. See id.
271. SeeN.Y. CiV. SERv. § 209(3)(c)-(d).
272. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. § 209(4)(c) (stating that "upon petition of either party, the board
shall refer the dispute to a public arbitration panel").

273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. The N.Y. Civil Service statute requires an examination of four factors, however,
one relates only to police officers and firefighters. This factor need not be considered in applying
interest arbitration to disputes involving attorneys. See id.
276. N.Y. Civ. SERv. § 209(4)(c).

277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
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evidence of abuse of discretion."
Whether by concerted action, interest arbitration, or in the context
of a restructured labor law, attorneys have an interest in forming and
joining labor unions. Collective action is a powerful means by which
attorneys, especially those engaged in the defense of the indigent, may
improve their conditions of employment. With better pay, reasonable
caseloads, and proper facilities and support, attorneys will be better able
to serve the interests of their clients and thereby fulfill their ethical
obligations.
VI. CONCLUSION

In Gideon v. Wainwright, ' the Supreme Court held that indigent
defendants in state court have the right to have counsel appointed for
them. '2 Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.... That
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries. 23
Lawyers in both the public and private sectors often face substantial
workplace problems. These problems constitute more than an
inconvenience. In some cases, they lead to the deprivation of clients'
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Thus, for lawyers who represent the
indigent, the existence of workplace problems may result in a failure to
protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In these
circumstances, lawyers become "luxuries," a result that Justice Black
cautioned against in Gideon.2

280. See id.
281. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
282. See id. at 339-40 (concluding that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is so
fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
283. Id. at 344.
284. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

33

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 6
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 18:299

Lawyers can solve their workplace problems through collective
action. Although lawyers traditionally have not seen collective action as
a solution to their workplace problems, attorneys in both the public and
private sectors frequently have an interest in joining unions. They also
have the right to do so, provided they do not fall within the supervisory
or managerial exceptions. Legal Aid lawyers, private court-appointed
counsel, and staff attorneys in public defender's offices and government
agencies are among those who are entitled to protection.
Attorneys employed in these capacities often are poorly paid and
burdened with excessive caseloads. In addition, they work in
circumstances that tend to interfere with their ability to comply with
their ethical obligations as set forth in rules of professional conduct.
Collective bargaining offers these attorneys a means of increasing their
wages, reducing their caseloads, and improving the conditions in which
they work.
In addition to traditional collective bargaining, attorneys may also
achieve their goals through modifications in labor law. For example, the
scope of bargaining may be expanded to require negotiations beyond
mandatory wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Also,
the principles of exclusive representation and company domination
could be expanded to allow attorneys to retain their professional
autonomy while engaging in collective action.
In certain circumstances, strikes may provide a solution to
attorneys' workplace problems; however, this form of concerted action
raises significant problems. In one instance, attorneys who engaged in a
work stoppage were convicted of violations of anti-trust law and, in
general, strikes tend to pose a risk of employer retaliation.2s For these
reasons, less extreme forms of collective action are preferable.
The most promising alternative open to lawyers who have become
union members is interest arbitration. Interest arbitration has been used
to prevent strikes by employees, such as firemen and policemen, whose
jobs are necessary for the maintenance of social order. It requires
attorneys and their employers to bargain in good faith about their
disputes. Where good faith negotiations cannot resolve their problems,
attorneys and their employers may resort to arbitration proceedings.
Interest arbitration provides attorneys with an effective way to
improve their wages, hours, and working conditions. For some lawyers,
these workplace improvements are a necessity. In their absence, the
lawyers' professional obligation to provide competent, zealous, and
285. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,422-23 (1990).
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faithful representation of their clients is compromised and the "noble
ideal" of "fair trials before impartial tribunals" is seriously
undermined. 6
Laura Midwood*and Amy Vitacco***

286. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
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